판결 이유
Where a party enters into a contract partly because of physical duress (threats of violence or death) and partly for independent commercial reasons, the contract is voidable if the duress was a cause — not necessarily the sole or predominant cause — of their entering into it. Duress to the person operates analogously to fraudulent misrepresentation: the burden shifts to the party who exerted the duress to demonstrate that it played no part whatsoever in the victim's decision. This distinguishes duress to the person from economic duress, where a but-for causation test applies and the claimant must show that the pressure was a significant cause leaving them with no practical choice.
사실관계
Armstrong, the chairman of a company, made death threats against Barton, the managing director, to pressure him into purchasing Armstrong's shares on favourable terms. Barton entered the agreement partly because of the threats and partly because he believed the deal was commercially acceptable.
판결 요약
The Privy Council (Lord Cross of Chelsea, Lord Simon of Glaisdale, and Lord Kilbrandon, with Lord Wilberforce and Lord Keith dissenting) held by a majority of 3-2 that the deed of release was voidable for duress to the person. Armstrong had telephoned Barton threatening to have him killed and to blow up his office if he did not comply. Barton in evidence acknowledged both the threats and his commercial interest in the transaction. The majority held that the analogy with deceit was apt: in deceit, the fraud need only be a cause, not the sole cause, of the claimant's loss. Applying the same principle to duress, it was sufficient that the threats were one of Barton's reasons for executing the deed. The burden then lay on Armstrong to prove they were not operative at all — a burden he could not discharge. Lord Wilberforce and Lord Keith dissented, preferring a narrower 'but for' test that would require the victim to show they would not have contracted absent the duress. The majority's approach has since been narrowed in economic duress cases but confirmed for physical duress.
주요 인용문
"If Armstrong's threats were 'a' reason for Barton's executing the deed he is entitled to relief even though he might well have entered into the contract if Armstrong had uttered no threats to him."
— Lord Cross at 121
"In this field, in my view, the relevant test is not whether the aggrieved party could have resisted the duress but whether he would have entered into the contract but for the duress."
— Lord Wilberforce at 121 (dissenting)
"The analogy with deceit is apposite: it has never been a requirement that fraud should be the sole inducement. It is enough that it is an inducement."
— Lord Cross at 120
후속 처리
Followed as the governing authority on duress to the person in English contract law. The 'contributing cause' test for physical duress is well established.
Distinguished in economic duress cases, where a stricter causation test applies. In DSND Subsea Ltd v Petroleum Geo-Services ASA [2000] BLR 530, Dyson J held that for economic duress the pressure must be 'a significant cause' leaving the claimant with no practical alternative.
Applied in Pao On v Lau Yiu Long [1980] AC 614 (PC), where the Privy Council considered the limits of duress to goods and commercial pressure, citing Barton v Armstrong as establishing the minimum causation threshold for duress claims.
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