판결 이유
Where a party to a contract repudiates it before the time fixed for performance — by making clear they will not perform their obligations — the other party has an immediate right to treat the contract as at an end and to bring an action for damages, without being required to wait until the date of performance. The doctrine of anticipatory breach holds that a renunciation of a future contractual obligation is itself a breach giving rise to an immediate cause of action. The innocent party need not stand idle and refuse alternative engagements while waiting for the performance date: they may mitigate their loss immediately.
사실관계
On 12 April 1852 De La Tour engaged Hochster as a courier to accompany him on a three-month European tour commencing on 1 June 1852, at a salary of £10 per month. On 11 May 1852 — three weeks before the start date — De La Tour wrote to Hochster to say that he had changed his mind and no longer required his services. Hochster accepted a different engagement from another employer and on 22 May 1852 — before 1 June — brought an action for breach of contract against De La Tour. The defendant argued that no cause of action could arise until the date of the breach, namely 1 June when performance would have been due.
판결 요약
The Queen's Bench Division (Lord Campbell CJ, giving the judgment with which the court agreed) held for Hochster and allowed the immediate action. Lord Campbell held that the rule urged by the defendant — that no action could be brought until 1 June — would cause injustice. It would require the claimant to hold himself ready and willing to perform throughout the period up to 1 June, refusing other engagements, while the defendant had already declared his refusal to perform. From the moment De La Tour renounced the contract, Hochster was entitled to consider it at an end and to seek alternative employment. The cause of action arose on the repudiation, not on the date performance was due. Lord Campbell acknowledged the novelty of the principle but justified it on grounds of convenience and justice: requiring the innocent party to wait until the contract date would be to create a situation where they cannot mitigate their loss without risking their legal position. The case is the foundation of the doctrine of anticipatory breach in English law.
주요 인용문
"It seems reasonable to allow an action to be brought before the day of performance, for the party may have already sustained damage: indeed it would be strange if there were no remedy for such an act."
— Lord Campbell CJ at 689
"If the claimant is deprived of rights to sue immediately, he must remain ready and willing to perform on 1 June and cannot seek alternative employment in the interval — which would be most unjust."
— Lord Campbell CJ at 689
"The promisee, if he pleases, may treat the notice of intention as inoperative and wait till the time when the act was to be done, still holding it to be a subsisting contract. But if he adopts the other view he has no means of mitigating any damage that may arise from the breach."
— Lord Campbell CJ at 691
후속 처리
The foundational authority for the doctrine of anticipatory breach, consistently followed in English law. Applied in White & Carter (Councils) Ltd v McGregor [1962] AC 413 (HL), which held that an innocent party need not accept a repudiation and may complete performance and claim the contract price.
The doctrine was developed in Frost v Knight (1872) LR 7 Ex 111, confirming that a renunciation of a contract to be performed in the future entitles the innocent party to bring an immediate action, and that any defence based on the performance obligation's not having arrived yet fails.
Applied in Vitol SA v Norelf Ltd (The Santa Clara) [1996] AC 800, where the House of Lords confirmed that an acceptance of a repudiation can be effected by conduct as well as words, and that the doctrine applies to instalment contracts.
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