판결 이유
The Caparo three-stage test is not a universal test to be applied afresh in every case of alleged negligence. Where a duty of care has already been recognised in an established category of situation, the court should apply that established principle directly rather than resort to Caparo. The Caparo test is for novel situations where no established precedent exists. A public authority, including the police, owes an ordinary duty of care not to cause foreseeable physical injury to persons through its own positive acts. The police are not in a specially privileged position: where their positive acts cause harm they are subject to the same liability in negligence as any private individual, even in the course of their operational activities.
사실관계
Mrs Doreen Robinson, aged 76, was walking along the pavement in Huddersfield town centre on 18 August 2008 when she was knocked over and injured by two police officers and a suspected drug dealer named Khan. The officers had been attempting to arrest Khan, a known drug dealer whom they had been watching. During the struggle to arrest Khan, all three of them fell onto Mrs Robinson. She suffered a fractured hip and other injuries. She brought a claim in negligence against the Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police. The trial judge dismissed the claim; the Court of Appeal dismissed her appeal; she appealed to the Supreme Court.
판결 요약
The Supreme Court unanimously allowed Mrs Robinson's appeal. Lord Reed (with whom Lord Mance, Lord Hodge, Lord Lloyd-Jones, and Lord Toulson agreed) gave the leading judgment and undertook a wide-ranging analysis of the law on duty of care and the role of the Caparo test. Lord Reed held that Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] had not intended to replace the incremental common law approach with a three-stage test to be applied in all cases; rather, it provided a method for novel situations. Where precedent establishes that a duty of care exists, the court should apply those established principles without recourse to Caparo. The police, like any other person, are subject to an ordinary duty of care for the foreseeable consequences of their positive acts. This was not a case of failure to protect (where the established rule is that the police owe no general duty to the public), but a case of the police creating a dangerous situation through their own positive action. The fact that the officers were acting in the course of a law enforcement operation did not immunise them from liability for harm caused by their positive acts.
주요 인용문
"It is normally only in a novel type of case, where established principles do not provide an answer, that the courts need to go beyond those principles in order to decide whether a duty of care should be recognised."
— Lord Reed at [29]
"In the present case, the police officers owed Mrs Robinson the normal duty of care owed by any person not to create dangers to the safety of a member of the public by their positive actions."
— Lord Reed at [70]
"The Caparo case was not intended to sweep away the established law... The analysis set out in Caparo is useful in novel situations, but it was not intended to provide a routine methodology to be applied in every case."
— Lord Reed at [27]–[29]
후속 처리
Applied in HXA v Surrey County Council [2023] UKSC 52, where the Supreme Court applied the Robinson principle that established duty categories do not need Caparo analysis and confirmed the narrow circumstances in which public authorities owe a duty to protect from third party harm.
Applied in CN v Poole Borough Council [2019] UKSC 25, where Lord Reed again confirmed that Caparo does not apply where established precedent governs, and restated when public authorities may owe a duty of care.
Distinguished in cases where the police are alleged to have failed to protect a claimant from harm caused by a third party, where the established rule that there is no general duty to protect continues to apply: Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2.
What To Do Next
Step-by-Step Guides
Know Your Rights
Get Professional Help