Inchoate Offences and Accomplices (Attempt, Conspiracy, Aiding)
The 'incomplete' offences — attempt (Criminal Attempts Act 1981), conspiracy (Criminal Law Act 1977), assisting or encouraging crime (Serious Crime Act 2007), and accessorial liability following R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8.
ਜਾਣ-ਪਛਾਣ
English criminal law catches not only completed offences but also conduct that falls short of completion — the 'inchoate' offences — and conduct that assists or encourages others to commit offences (accessorial liability). The three principal inchoate offences are attempt (Criminal Attempts Act 1981), conspiracy (statutory under Criminal Law Act 1977, plus surviving common-law conspiracies to defraud and to corrupt public morals/outrage public decency), and the three encouraging-or-assisting offences in the Serious Crime Act 2007 ss.44-46 (replacing the common-law offence of incitement). Accessorial liability — the law of secondary parties — was substantially reformed in 2016 by R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8, which overturned 30 years of joint-enterprise authority on the mens rea required. The Supreme Court held that the mental element for a secondary party is intention to assist or encourage the principal offence; foresight that the principal might commit it is only evidence of intention, not a substitute for it.
In Brief
English law criminalises not only completed offences but also attempts (Criminal Attempts Act 1981), conspiracies (Criminal Law Act 1977 plus surviving common-law forms), and encouraging or assisting offences (Serious Crime Act 2007 ss.44-46). Accessorial liability (aiding, abetting, counselling, procuring) was substantially reformed in 2016 — under R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8 the secondary party must intend to assist or encourage the principal offence; foresight is only evidence of intention.
ਮੂਲ ਸਿਧਾਂਤ
Attempt — Criminal Attempts Act 1981 s.1: with intent to commit an indictable offence, doing an act 'more than merely preparatory' to its commission. Requires specific intent — recklessness is insufficient (R v Whybrow (1951) 35 Cr App R 141 for attempted murder).
Impossibility no defence — s.1(2) and s.1(3) CAA 1981; reversed Anderton v Ryan [1985] AC 560 via R v Shivpuri [1987] AC 1.
Statutory conspiracy — Criminal Law Act 1977 s.1: agreement between 2+ persons to pursue a course of conduct that will necessarily amount to or involve an offence. Requires intention.
Common-law conspiracies — conspiracy to defraud (Scott v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1975] AC 819) and conspiracies to corrupt public morals / outrage public decency survive.
Encouraging or assisting — Serious Crime Act 2007 ss.44-46: doing an act capable of encouraging or assisting an offence; intending / believing / believing-with-foresight that an offence will be committed.
Accessorial liability — Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 s.8 (indictable) / Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 s.44 (summary): aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring. Post-R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8, the secondary party must intend to assist or encourage the principal offence with knowledge of any essential matters.
Joint enterprise post-Jogee — foresight is evidence of intention, not a free-standing route to liability. Convictions secured under the pre-Jogee 'PJE' doctrine can be challenged out of time only if there is 'substantial injustice'.
Withdrawal — a secondary party can escape liability by an effective and timely withdrawal communicated to the principal (R v Becerra and Cooper [1975] 62 Cr App R 212).
ਮੁੱਖ ਐਕਟ
Criminal Attempts Act 1981
Criminal Law Act 1977
Accessories and Abettors Act 1861
Serious Crime Act 2007
ਪ੍ਰਮੁੱਖ ਕੇਸ
R v Jogee; Ruddock v The Queen
[2016] UKSC 8
R v Shivpuri
[1987] AC 1
R v Geddes
[1996] Crim LR 894
Scott v Metropolitan Police Commissioner
[1975] AC 819
R v Becerra and Cooper
(1975) 62 Cr App R 212
Frequently Asked Questions
What does 'more than merely preparatory' mean for attempt?
Section 1(1) Criminal Attempts Act 1981 requires the defendant to have done an act 'more than merely preparatory' to the commission of the offence. The leading guidance comes from R v Geddes [1996] Crim LR 894: had the defendant moved from planning to execution? Examples on the line include R v Gullefer [1990] 1 WLR 1063 (running onto a racecourse to stop a race — too preparatory) and R v Jones [1990] 1 WLR 1057 (climbing into a car with a sawn-off shotgun and pointing it — sufficiently committed).
How did R v Jogee change joint enterprise?
Before Jogee, the law (R v Powell; English [1999] 1 AC 1) was that a secondary party was liable for a co-defendant's offence if they foresaw the principal might commit it. Jogee held this took 'a wrong turn' — the correct mens rea is intention to assist or encourage. Foresight is admissible evidence of intention, not a substitute. The change is prospective in effect, but a conviction made under the old rule can be challenged only if there is 'substantial injustice' (R v Johnson [2016] EWCA Crim 1613).
What is the difference between conspiracy to defraud and statutory conspiracy?
Statutory conspiracy (Criminal Law Act 1977 s.1) is agreement to pursue conduct that will necessarily involve a substantive offence. Conspiracy to defraud is a separate common-law offence: agreement to defraud by dishonesty, even where no statutory offence is intended (Scott v MPC). The Fraud Act 2006 narrowed the practical scope of conspiracy to defraud but did not abolish it.
Can an attempt to commit the impossible be charged?
Yes. Section 1(2) and s.1(3) Criminal Attempts Act 1981 expressly cover impossible attempts. R v Shivpuri [1987] AC 1 confirmed this and overruled Anderton v Ryan [1985] AC 560 (which had briefly held the opposite). If the defendant believes the relevant facts to be such that an offence is being committed but they are not, the attempt is still charged.
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