Ratio Decidendi
Duress is not available as a defence to murder, whether as a principal or as an aider and abettor. A person who takes an innocent life cannot invoke threats to their own life as a defence.
Hechos
Howe and others participated in two murders. Howe claimed he acted under duress — he had been threatened by a man named Murray that he would be killed if he did not participate. In the first killing, Howe was an aider/abettor; in the second, a principal.
Resumen de la sentencia
The House of Lords held that duress was no defence to murder in any capacity, overruling DPP for Northern Ireland v Lynch [1975] which had allowed duress for secondary parties. Lord Hailsham held that the ordinary person of reasonable fortitude would be expected to sacrifice their own life rather than take an innocent life.
Citas clave
"I do not at all accept in relation to the defence of murder that it is either good morals, good policy or good law to suggest that the ordinary man of reasonable fortitude is not to be supposed to be capable of heroism if he is asked to take an innocent life rather than sacrifice his own."
— Lord Hailsham LC
Tratamiento posterior
The definitive authority that duress cannot be a defence to murder. Confirmed in R v Gotts [1992] (attempted murder).