Investigatory Powers Act 2016

Resumen

The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA 2016) is the comprehensive UK statute governing the powers of public authorities to conduct surveillance, intercept communications, and acquire data. It was enacted following the Snowden disclosures and the recommendations of the Anderson Review (A Question of Trust, 2015) and the Intelligence and Security Committee's report on Privacy and Security. The Act consolidated and replaced a fragmented legislative landscape including the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA), the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014, and intelligence agency-specific provisions. Its key structural innovation is the 'double-lock' authorisation mechanism: warrants for the most intrusive powers must be issued by the Secretary of State and then approved by a Judicial Commissioner (a serving or former senior judge). Part 2 governs targeted interception and examination of communications content; Part 3 governs targeted acquisition of communications data (who, when, and where — not content); Part 4 requires designated communications providers to retain internet connection records (ICRs) for up to 12 months; Part 5 governs equipment interference (hacking) by law enforcement; and Parts 6 and 7 govern bulk powers available to the intelligence agencies including bulk interception, bulk acquisition of communications data, bulk equipment interference, and bulk personal datasets. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner's Office (IPCO) provides oversight, publishing an annual report on the exercise of the powers.

Puntos clave

• Double-lock authorisation — the most intrusive warrants (targeted interception, targeted examination of communications, equipment interference, bulk powers) must be issued by the Secretary of State and then approved by a Judicial Commissioner before taking effect (Parts 2, 5, 6)
• Targeted interception (Part 2) — a targeted interception warrant authorises the interception of communications sent by or to specific persons, on a specific set of premises, or between specific pairs; must be necessary and proportionate for national security, preventing or detecting serious crime, or safeguarding the UK's economic wellbeing
• Communications data (Part 3) — designated senior officers may authorise acquisition of communications data (subscriber information, traffic data, service use data) without a warrant; judicial authorisation required for data acquisition by law enforcement for intelligence purposes from 2016
• Internet connection records (Part 4, s.87) — telecommunications operators may be required by notice to retain ICRs for up to 12 months; ICRs show which internet services a device connects to but not the content of communications; the power was challenged in Privacy International v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2021] UKSC 18 and partly invalidated as regards automatic bulk retention
• Equipment interference (Part 5) — warrants authorise relevant agencies and law enforcement to covertly interfere with electronic equipment (computers, phones, other devices) to obtain data; separate warrant regime for intelligence agencies (Part 5) and law enforcement (s.106)
• Bulk powers (Parts 6–7) — the intelligence agencies (GCHQ, MI5, MI6) may obtain bulk interception warrants, bulk acquisition warrants, bulk equipment interference warrants, and bulk personal dataset warrants; bulk powers are subject to the same double-lock; a public interest test must be applied
• Investigatory Powers Commissioner (ss.227-237) — the Investigatory Powers Commissioner's Office (IPCO), headed by a serving or former senior judge, oversees the use of all investigatory powers under the Act, reviews warrants, and publishes annual transparency reports
• Criminal offences — it is an offence to unlawfully intercept communications (s.3), to knowingly or recklessly obtain communications data without lawful authority (s.84), and to use powers for purposes other than those authorised

Partes y secciones

Historial de enmiendas