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UK Law Reference
All Cases
Constitutional Law
House of Lords
1993
UK-wide

Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart

[1992] UKHL 3; [1993] AC 593

Independent editorial summary โ€” not the official judgment. Read the full judgment via the source link.

Ratio Decidendi

The strict exclusionary rule against reference to Parliamentary materials in statutory interpretation (established in Davis v Johnson [1979] AC 264 and earlier authority) is relaxed. Where primary legislation is (a) ambiguous or obscure, or its literal meaning would lead to absurdity, AND (b) the material relied upon consists of one or more clear statements by a minister or other promoter of the Bill (together where necessary with such other Parliamentary material as is required to understand those statements and their effect), AND (c) the statements relied upon are themselves clear, then the court may have regard to those statements as an aid to ascertaining the intention of Parliament. Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689 does not prohibit such use of Hansard, because it is not for the purpose of impeaching or questioning proceedings in Parliament but merely as an extrinsic aid to construing the legislation Parliament passed.

Facts

Mr Hart and nine other schoolmasters at Malvern College were assessed to income tax under Schedule E of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 on the benefit-in-kind of reduced school fees for their own children. The dispute was whether the 'cash equivalent' of the benefit under section 63(1) and (2) of the 1988 Act should be calculated on the basis of (i) the marginal cost to the school of educating the masters' children โ€” effectively nil, because the places would otherwise have been empty โ€” or (ii) the average cost per pupil across the school as a whole. The Inland Revenue contended for the average-cost basis; the schoolmasters argued for marginal cost. The statutory wording was capable of bearing both meanings. During the passage of the Finance Bill 1976 (the predecessor provision), the Financial Secretary to the Treasury had given clear assurances in committee that the marginal-cost basis would apply to in-house benefits of this kind. The Special Commissioners and the Court of Appeal had decided for the Revenue on the average-cost basis, applying the orthodox exclusionary rule that prevented courts from looking at Hansard.

Judgment Summary

After an initial hearing before five Law Lords the matter was reargued before a panel of seven (Lord Mackay LC, Lord Keith, Lord Bridge, Lord Griffiths, Lord Ackner, Lord Oliver, and Lord Browne-Wilkinson). The House held by a majority (six to one โ€” Lord Mackay LC dissenting on the principle of admitting Hansard) that the exclusionary rule could be relaxed in the limited circumstances set out by Lord Browne-Wilkinson, and that, having reference to the Financial Secretary's statements, the marginal-cost basis was Parliament's clear intention. The appeal was therefore allowed and the schoolmasters' children's fees were taxed at marginal cost. Lord Mackay LC, dissenting on principle, accepted the merits but warned that admitting Hansard would impose disproportionate costs on litigation and produce only marginal interpretative benefit. Lord Browne-Wilkinson's three-stage test (ambiguity, ministerial statement, clarity) has shaped the use of Hansard in every subsequent generation of statutory-interpretation case-law; courts have nonetheless been cautious about its expansion, recognising the dangers Lord Mackay foresaw. The decision sits at the centre of the modern law on statutory interpretation alongside the purposive/contextual approach in Inco Europe Ltd v First Choice Distribution [2000] 1 WLR 586 and the principle of legality articulated in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115.

Key Quotes

"The exclusionary rule should be relaxed so as to permit reference to Parliamentary materials where (a) legislation is ambiguous or obscure, or leads to an absurdity; (b) the material relied upon consists of one or more statements by a Minister or other promoter of the Bill together if necessary with such other Parliamentary material as is necessary to understand such statements and their effect; (c) the statements relied upon are clear."

โ€” Lord Browne-Wilkinson at 640

"Why then cannot the courts look at Hansard? It is true that the courts must not impeach or question proceedings in Parliament. But there is a difference between criticising statements made in Parliament and merely seeing what Parliament said."

โ€” Lord Browne-Wilkinson at 638

"The days have long passed when the courts adopted a strict constructionist view of interpretation which required them to adopt the literal meaning of the language. The courts now adopt a purposive approach which seeks to give effect to the true purpose of legislation and are prepared to look at much extraneous material that bears upon the background against which the legislation was enacted."

โ€” Lord Browne-Wilkinson at 635

"Such an inquiry will be costly and time consuming, and in the end will give little assistance to the court. The cost may be considerable. The judges of first instance will have to undertake their own research into Hansard."

โ€” Lord Mackay LC (dissenting) at 615

Subsequent Treatment

Followed

Pepper v Hart is the leading authority on the use of Hansard in statutory interpretation in England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. The three preconditions are treated as cumulative and strict.

Qualified

In Wilson v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2003] UKHL 40, [2004] 1 AC 816 the House of Lords narrowed the scope of Pepper v Hart in human-rights compatibility analysis: courts should be slow to use Hansard to determine whether legislation pursues a legitimate aim or is proportionate under the HRA 1998, because such use risks treating ministerial statements as if they were legislative provisions.

Restricted

Successive cases (notably R v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, ex parte Spath Holme [2001] 2 AC 349 (HL); R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56) have emphasised that Hansard cannot be used to extend the meaning of a statute beyond what the language reasonably bears โ€” Pepper v Hart is an aid to interpretation, not a licence to rewrite.

Considered

In Robinson v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland [2002] UKHL 32 Lord Hoffmann reaffirmed that courts use Hansard 'most sparingly' and only where the Pepper v Hart conditions are clearly met. Academic and judicial criticism (Lord Steyn's 'Pepper v Hart: A Re-examination' [2001] OJLS 59) has questioned the constitutional basis of the rule, but the case stands.

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