Ratio Decidendi
A person who is a stranger to a contract — that is, a person who is neither a party to the agreement nor has provided any consideration — cannot sue upon it to enforce rights purportedly created for their benefit, even if the contract was expressly intended to benefit them. This decision is an early statement of two interconnected doctrines: privity of contract (only a party to a contract can enforce it) and the consideration rule (a claimant must have provided consideration to found a contractual action). A third-party beneficiary of a contract, however clearly intended by the contracting parties, has no cause of action to enforce the contract.
Ffeithiau
William Tweddle and Miss Guy were about to be married. In anticipation of the marriage, a written agreement was entered into between William Guy (the bride's father) and John Tweddle (the groom's father) by which they each agreed to pay a sum of money to William Tweddle (the groom). The agreement expressly stated that William Tweddle was to have full power to sue the parties to the agreement in any court of law. Guy died before paying and Tweddle sued Guy's executor, Atkinson, to recover the sum promised by Guy.
Crynodeb o'r dyfarniad
The Queen's Bench (Wightman J, Crompton J, and Blackburn J) held that Tweddle could not maintain the action. Wightman J held that a contract made for the benefit of a third party cannot be enforced by that third party in an action at law, because the third party provided no consideration. Crompton J agreed, emphasising that it would be a monstrous proposition to allow a stranger to consideration to take advantage of a contract. Blackburn J, while sympathetic to Tweddle's situation, felt compelled to follow the rule that consideration must move from the plaintiff. The court therefore dismissed the claim. Although the contract expressly gave Tweddle the right to sue, this could not create a legal right because he had given nothing for the promise. The case consolidated the doctrine of privity and the rule that consideration must move from the promisee, setting the stage for the House of Lords' definitive statement of these doctrines in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v Selfridge & Co Ltd [1915] AC 847.
Dyfyniadau allweddol
"No stranger to the consideration can take advantage of a contract, although made for his benefit."
— Wightman J at 398
"It would be a monstrous proposition to say that a person was a party to the contract for the purpose of suing upon it for his own advantage, and not a party to it for the purpose of being sued."
— Crompton J at 398
"Though the promise was made for his benefit, he cannot bring an action upon it for the want of consideration, and for the want of privity of contract."
— Blackburn J at 399
Triniaeth ddilynol
The privity principle was affirmed and elevated to a rule of English law by the House of Lords in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v Selfridge & Co Ltd [1915] AC 847, per Viscount Haldane LC.
The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 now allows a third party to enforce a contractual term if the contract expressly provides that they may, or if the term purports to confer a benefit on them, unless on a proper construction the parties did not intend the term to be enforceable by the third party.
Considered in Beswick v Beswick [1968] AC 58, where the House of Lords held that the principle in Tweddle still prevented enforcement in the widow's personal capacity, but that the promisee's estate could obtain specific performance of the promise for the beneficiary's benefit.
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