判决理由
The law on accessory liability in joint enterprise was wrongly extended by R v Chan Wing-Siu [1985] AC 168 (PC) and R v Powell; R v English [1999] AC 1 (HL). Those decisions incorrectly elevated mere foresight that the principal might commit an offence into a sufficient mental element for accessory liability, thereby creating what has been called 'parasitic accessory liability'. The correct principle, derived from first principles of accessory liability, is that the prosecution must prove that the accessory intended to assist or encourage the principal to commit the offence charged. Foresight that the principal might commit the offence is evidence from which the jury may infer such intent, but it is not equivalent to intent as a matter of law. Where D2 is present at a joint enterprise and the principal D1 goes on to commit an offence, D2 is guilty as accessory only if D2 intended to assist or encourage D1's act with the requisite mens rea for that offence.
事实
R v Jogee was heard with Ruddock v The Queen (a Privy Council appeal from Jamaica), both raising the same point of law. In R v Jogee, Jogee and his co-defendant Mohammed Hirsi had gone to the home of Naomi Reid together on the night of the killing. During a series of confrontations, Hirsi stabbed Paul Fyfe (Reid's partner) to death with a knife. Jogee was outside the house throughout the stabbing but had been encouraging Hirsi, including shouting at him to 'do something' to Fyfe. Jogee was convicted of murder on the basis that he had foreseen the possibility that Hirsi might use the knife with intent to cause serious harm — applying the law as stated in Chan Wing-Siu and Powell; English. Jogee appealed, arguing the foresight-based approach was wrong as a matter of law.
判决摘要
The Supreme Court (Lord Hughes and Lord Toulson giving the joint judgment, with Lord Neuberger, Lady Hale, Lord Mance, Lord Kerr, and Lord Thomas agreeing) allowed the appeal and declared that the law had taken a 'wrong turn' in Chan Wing-Siu. The court traced the historical development of accessory liability from its common law roots, finding that the earlier authorities had not in fact supported the foresight-as-sufficient-intent approach. The correct rule was that the prosecution must prove the accessory intended to assist or encourage the principal to commit the offence, which in a murder case means the accessory must have intended to assist or encourage the principal to cause death or serious bodily harm. The court acknowledged that correcting the error would not automatically lead to acquittal in every case because foresight remained potent evidence of intent. Jogee's conviction for murder was quashed and replaced with a conviction for manslaughter. The court also recognised that the change in the law would not automatically entitle all those convicted under the old law to have their convictions overturned: the test for appeals out of time would require applicants to show a substantial injustice.
关键引述
"The error was to equate foresight with intent to assist, as a matter of law; the correct approach is to treat it as evidence of intent."
— Lord Hughes and Lord Toulson at [87]
"It is a matter of profound regret that it has taken so long for the error to be corrected. The direction approved in Chan Wing-Siu has been applied in this country for over 30 years."
— Lord Hughes and Lord Toulson at [100]
"If D2 participates in a venture with D1, with a conditional intent to use a weapon with intent to cause serious bodily harm if required, he has the mens rea for murder if D1 uses the weapon to commit murder."
— Lord Hughes and Lord Toulson at [98]
后续处理
Applied in R v Johnson [2016] EWCA Crim 1613, where the Court of Appeal set out guidance on when convictions under the old law could be reopened and what 'substantial injustice' meant.
In R v Anwar [2016] EWCA Crim 551 the Court of Appeal confirmed that Jogee applies to all joint enterprise convictions for murder and serious offences where foresight alone founded the conviction.
The Supreme Court in Jogee itself limited the practical scope of appeals by confirming that the test for leave to appeal out of time remains whether there is a 'substantial injustice', preventing mass reopening of old convictions.
What To Do Next
Step-by-Step Guides
Know Your Rights
Common Scenarios
Get Professional Help