Edwards v National Coal Board
[1949] 1 KB 704
Independent editorial summary — not the official judgment. Read the full judgment via the source link.
Ratio Decidendi
"Reasonably practicable" is a narrower term than "physically possible": the duty-holder must make a computation in which the quantum of risk is placed on one scale and the sacrifice involved in the measures necessary for averting the risk (whether in money, time or trouble) on the other. The duty is discharged only if there is a gross disproportion between them — the risk being insignificant in relation to the sacrifice — and the onus of showing this rests on the defendant.
Facts
The case was a claim against the National Coal Board for breach of statutory duty under mine-safety legislation, in which the Board relied on the statutory defence that it had not been reasonably practicable to avoid the breach; the Court of Appeal held that the risk of accident had to be weighed against the measures necessary to eliminate it, cost included (as the case is described in Langley v Coal Authority [2003] EWCA Civ 204 at [61]). The detailed accident facts are not recited in the freely available authoritative sources from which this entry is compiled.
Judgment Summary
The Court of Appeal construed "reasonably practicable" as requiring a weighing exercise rather than mere physical possibility. Tucker LJ held that in every case the risk has to be weighed against the measures necessary to eliminate it, the greater the risk the less the weight to be given to cost; Asquith LJ formulated the classic "computation" of quantum of risk against sacrifice, with the defendant discharging the onus only on proof of gross disproportion. That formulation has since been treated as the classic exposition of the phrase, carried into the Factories Act 1961 and, via Austin Rover Group Ltd v HM Inspector of Factories [1990] 1 AC 619, into the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974.
Key Quotes
"'Reasonably practicable' is a narrower term than 'physically possible' and seems to me to imply that a computation must be made by the owner in which the quantum of risk is placed on one scale and the sacrifice involved in the measures necessary for averting the risk (whether in money, time or trouble) is placed in the other, and that, if it be shown that there is a gross disproportion between them – the risk being insignificant in relation to the sacrifice – the defendants discharge the onus on them."
— Asquith LJ at p 712, as quoted in Baker v Quantum Clothing Group [2009] EWCA Civ 499 at [82](verbatim, verified against the judgment)
"in every case it is the risk that has to be weighed against the measures necessary to eliminate the risk. The greater the risk, no doubt, the less will be the weight to be given to the factor of cost."
— Tucker LJ at p 710, as quoted by Lord Dyson in Baker v Quantum Clothing Group [2011] UKSC 17 at [129](verbatim, verified against the judgment)
Subsequent Treatment
Described as "the classic exposition of reasonable practicability" and applied by the Supreme Court in Baker v Quantum Clothing Group [2011] UKSC 17 when construing s 29(1) of the Factories Act 1961 (Lord Dyson at [129]; Lord Kerr at [184], adopting Asquith LJ's gross-disproportion formulation).
Adopted for the phrase "so far as is reasonably practicable" in the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974: Lord Goff in Austin Rover Group Ltd v HM Inspector of Factories [1990] 1 AC 619 built the established risk-versus-measures weighing test on Asquith LJ's judgment in Edwards, as set out in R v HTM Ltd [2006] EWCA Crim 1156 at [17]-[18].
Cited in Langley v Coal Authority [2003] EWCA Civ 204 at [61] for the proposition that, under the statutory defence, the risk of accident has to be weighed against the measures necessary to eliminate the risk, the cost of those measures being a relevant factor.
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