Haile v London Borough of Waltham Forest
[2015] UKSC 34
Independent editorial summary — not the official judgment. Read the full judgment via the source link.
Ratio Decidendi
Whether someone “became homeless intentionally” under s.191(1) of the Housing Act 1996 is tested at the date they ceased to occupy the accommodation, as Din v Wandsworth decided, but there must also be a continuing causal connection between that deliberate conduct and the homelessness existing at the date of the authority's inquiry. A later involuntary event which would have made the applicant homeless in any event supersedes the earlier deliberate conduct and breaks the chain of causation, so the applicant is not intentionally homeless.
Facts
Ms Haile surrendered her tenancy of a bedsitting room in a hostel in Leyton on 25 October 2011 because she was unhappy about smells there, and applied to Waltham Forest as homeless on 24 November 2011. On 15 February 2012 she gave birth to a daughter; only single people were allowed to live in the hostel, so she would have had to leave it on the birth in any event. The council, upheld on review, decided she had become homeless intentionally because she had given up accommodation which it would have been reasonable for her to continue to occupy until she gave birth, treating the birth as irrelevant.
Judgment Summary
The Supreme Court allowed her appeal by a majority of four to one (Lord Reed giving the lead judgment, Lord Carnwath dissenting). Din v Wandsworth remains good law both on the time at which the s.191(1) definition is tested and on the need for a continuing causal connection with the homelessness existing at the date of the inquiry, but the question at that stage is what actually caused the current homelessness. Because the birth of her baby meant Ms Haile would have been homeless when her case was considered whether or not she had left the hostel, her surrender of the tenancy was no longer the operative cause and she could not be found intentionally homeless; Din was distinguished as involving hypothetical rather than actual supervening events.
Key Quotes
"As I have indicated, a later event constituting an involuntary cause of homelessness can be regarded as superseding the applicant’s earlier deliberate conduct, where in view of the later event it cannot reasonably be said that, but for the applicant’s deliberate conduct, he or she would not have become homeless."
— Lord Reed at [63](verbatim, verified against the judgment)
"The birth of the baby meant that the appellant would be homeless, at the time when her case was considered, whether or not she had left the hostel when and for the reasons that she did. She had not therefore jumped the queue as a result of her earlier decision to surrender the tenancy."
— Lord Reed at [67](verbatim, verified against the judgment)
Subsequent Treatment
The leading modern authority on the causation element of intentional homelessness under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996, explaining and distinguishing Din v Wandsworth.
What To Do Next
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