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UK Law Reference
All Cases
Criminal Law
Supreme Court
2013
England & Wales

R v Hughes

[2013] UKSC 56

Independent editorial summary — not the official judgment. Read the full judgment via the source link.

Ratio Decidendi

Under section 3ZB of the Road Traffic Act 1988 the expression “causes the death of another person by driving” requires more than the mere presence of the defendant's vehicle on the road to be struck: there must be some act or omission in the control of the car, involving some element of fault (whether or not amounting to careless or inconsiderate driving), which contributed in some more than minimal way to the death. “But for” causation is not enough, and as a penal statute creating a form of homicide the section is construed with a degree of strictness in favour of the accused.

Facts

Mr Hughes was driving his family home in his camper van along the A69, faultlessly and at a steady 45-55 mph, when a car driven by Mr Dickinson - who was under the influence of heroin and overtired after a series of 12-hour night shifts - veered repeatedly across the road and smashed into the camper van; Mr Dickinson died of his injuries. It was accepted on all sides that there was nothing Mr Hughes could do to avoid the collision, but he was uninsured and held only a provisional licence, and he was prosecuted under section 3ZB of the Road Traffic Act 1988 for causing death by driving while uninsured and otherwise than in accordance with a licence. The Recorder of Newcastle ruled that he had not caused the death, but the Court of Appeal, considering itself bound by R v Williams, ruled that he had in law caused it.

Judgment Summary

Lord Hughes and Lord Toulson, giving the judgment of a unanimous court, held that Parliament's choice of the words “causes … death … by driving” imports the common law's common-sense approach to causation, which distinguishes a mere “but for” cause that sets the stage for an occurrence from a legally effective cause of it. By the test of common sense, what brought about Mr Dickinson's death was his own dangerous driving under the influence of drugs; since it was agreed that there was nothing Mr Hughes did or omitted to do in the manner of his driving which contributed in any way to the death, the appeal was allowed and the Recorder's ruling restored. Juries should be directed that the Crown need not prove careless or inconsiderate driving, but that there must be something open to proper criticism in the defendant's driving, beyond the mere presence of the vehicle on the road, which contributed in some more than minimal way to the death.

Key Quotes

"By the test of common sense, whilst the driving by Mr Hughes created the opportunity for his car to be run into by Mr Dickinson, what brought about the latter’s death was his own dangerous driving under the influence of drugs."

Lord Hughes and Lord Toulson, para 25(verbatim, verified against the judgment)

"Juries should thus be directed that it is not necessary for the Crown to prove careless or inconsiderate driving, but that there must be something open to proper criticism in the driving of the defendant, beyond the mere presence of the vehicle on the road, and which contributed in some more than minimal way to the death."

Lord Hughes and Lord Toulson, para 33(verbatim, verified against the judgment)

Subsequent Treatment

Good law

Applied by the Supreme Court in R v Taylor [2016] UKSC 5, which adopted the same approach to the parallel expression in the aggravated vehicle-taking offence under section 12A of the Theft Act 1968, holding that liability for injury or damage likewise requires some fault in the driving.